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Abstract: In the Minority, Majority and Dollar Games (MG, MAJG, $G) synthetic agents compete for 
rewards, at each time-step acting in accord with the previously best-performing of their limited sets of 
strategies. Different components and/or aspects of real-world financial markets are modelled by these 
games. In the MG, agents compete for scarce resources; in the MAJG agents imitate the group in the hope 
of exploiting a trend; in the $G agents attempt to successfully predict and benefit from trends as well as 
changes in the direction of a market. It has been previously shown that in the MG for a reasonable number 
of preliminary time steps preceding equilibrium (Time Horizon MG, THMG), agents’ attempt to optimize 
their gains by active strategy selection is “illusory”: The calculated hypothetical gains of their individual 
strategies is greater on average than agents’ actual average gains. Furthermore, if a small proportion of 
agents deliberately choose and act in accord with their seemingly worst performing strategy, these outper-
form all other agents on average, and even attain mean positive gain, otherwise rare for agents in the MG. 
This latter phenomenon raises the question as to how well the optimization procedure works in the MAJG 
and $G. We demonstrate that the illusion of control is absent in MAJG and $G. In other words, low-
entropy (more informative) strategies under-perform high-entropy (or random) strategies in the MG but 
outperform them in the MAJG and $G. This provides further clarification of the kinds of situations subject 
to genuine control, and those not, in set-ups a priori defined to emphasize the importance of optimization. 
 
PACS. 89.75.-k Complex systems – 89.65Gh Economics; econophysics, financial markets, busi-
ness and management – 02.50.Le Decision theory and game theory  
 
1 Introduction 
Langer’s phrase, “illusion of control” [1] describes the fact that individuals appear hard-
wired to over-attribute success to skill, and to underestimate the role of chance, when both are in 
fact present. We have previously shown [2] that in one of the most extensively-studied agent-
based game-model of markets, the minority game (MG), agents’ control is illusory in the follow-
ing sense: The mean actual performance of all agents averaged over many different initial condi-
tions is poorer than the mean hypothetical performance of all their given strategies. The finding is 
striking because at each time-step agents deploy that strategy with the best such hypothetical per-
formance. This finding is most generally true under the following conditions: The initial state is 
iterated for a “reasonable” number of time-steps (≤ 2000 say) short of equilibrium (≥ 5000 say) at 
which point a rolling window of cumulative strategy scores is maintained, which defines the 
specificity of the Time Horizon MG (THMG) as compared with the MG. In this case, the illusion 
is observed for all m (m is the number of bits of binary history in agents’ memory and an “m-bit 
history” consists of a string of 1’s and 0’s of length m. 1 indicates that a minority of agents have 
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adopted action “-1”, 0 indicates that a minority of agents have adopted action “+1”). The finding 
is less generally true in the MG strictly speaking, in which the system is always allowed to run to 
equilibrium. In that case, it is true only for almost all m, and not true (but only, and just barely) at 
the so-called critical point 2 0.34
cm
c N
α = = , where 2
m
N
α ≡  in general and N is the number of 
agents. For example with N=31, . Effectively, this means that as memory 
is in discrete units. However, equilibrium in the MG proper is only reached after 
3 3.4 4cm< = < 4cm ≡
~ 1 100 2m+× it-
erations away from cα and orders or magnitude more near cα , therefore for N=31 at mc=4, 
iterations.  Arguably, no real-world market is sufficiently stationary to attain such an 
equilibrium state.  
3200eqt 
Another important finding presented in [2] is the surprising fact that, if a small proportion of 
agents (≤ 0.15, e.g., 3 of 31) deploy at each time-step their previously worst performing strategy, 
these agents on average outperform all others. In fact they relatively consistently attain on aver-
age net positive gain, which is otherwise rare in the MG as the mean gain for both strategies and 
agents is in general always negative due to the minority rule. Note that such an inversion of the 
selection rule is a symmetric alteration in agent behavior and involves no privileging or increase 
in computational capacity.  
The success of such “counteradaptive” agents is a further marker of the “illusory” nature of 
the standard optimization rule (“choose best”). But it also raises the following question: May one 
correctly think of such an inverted rule as equivalent to these agents’ playing a Majority Game 
(MAJG) instead? It would seem on the face of it that as they are not optimizing to be in the mi-
nority, they must be optimizing to be in the majority but failing, and rather inadvertently succeed 
in finding the minority remarkably often. By this reasoning it seems to follow that in a game 
where all agents are striving to be in the majority (MAJG), select agents that optimize instead to 
be in the minority will likewise succeed disproportionately implying that the MAJG should also 
demonstrate an “illusion of control”. A similar argument could be made, perhaps, with respect to 
the $G since players of this game are rewarded according to a time-lagged majority rule. (The 
formal distinctions among the three types of games are specified in the following section.)  
The goal of the present paper is to clarify these questions and demonstrate that agents who 
invert their optimization rule in the MG are not actually playing a MAJG and that no illusion of 
control is found in either the MAJG or the $G. We discuss our results in terms of persistent ver-
sus anti-persistent characteristics of the time series generated by the various models. In a follow-
up to this paper [3], we relate these comparative results to different characteristics of markets—or 
different phases they may enter—as real-world agents alter their game-playing behavior. 
We first briefly review the formal structure of each of the MG, MAJG and $G. We then pre-
sent the results of extensive numerical simulations. Finally we discuss the differences that emerge 
in terms of persistent versus anti-persistent time-series. 
 
2 Minority, Majority and $ Games 
2.1 Definition and overview of Minority Games (MG) and Time-Horizon MG (THMG) 
MGs exemplify situations in which the “rational expectations” mechanism of standard economic 
theory fails. This mechanism in effect asks, “what expectation model would lead to collective ac-
tions that would on average validate the model, assuming everyone adopted it?”[4]. In minority 
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games, a large number of interacting decision-making agents, each aiming for personal gain in an 
artificial universe with scarce resources, try to anticipate the actions of others on the basis of in-
complete information. Those who subsequently find themselves in the minority group gain. 
Therefore, expectations that are held in common negate themselves, leading to anti-persistent be-
havior both for the aggregate behavior and for individuals. Minority games have been much stud-
ied as repeated games with expectation indeterminacy, multiple equilibria and inductive optimi-
zation behavior [5,6]. 
Each of the N players have to choose one out of two alternatives at each time step based on 
info
for 
ristic of the MG that distinguishes it from the MAJG and the $G is the corre-
spon
stem from the fact that agents strive to be 
diffe
rmation represented as a binary time series A(t). Those who happen to be in the minority win. 
Each element of the time series encodes which alternative is the winning (minority) one. Each 
agent is endowed with S strategies. Each strategy gives a prediction for the next outcome A(t) 
based on the history of the last m realizations A(t-1), …, A(t-m) (m is called the memory size of 
the agents). Each agent holds the same number S of (in general different) strategies among the 
22
m
total number of strategies. The S strategies of each agent are chosen at random but once and 
all at the beginning of the game—thus the system is quenched at its initial disorder. At each 
time t, in the absence of better information, in order to decide between the two alternatives for 
A(t), each agent uses her most successful strategy in terms of payoff accumulated since t=1. If 
instead hypothetical points are summed over a rolling window of finite length τ up to the last in-
formation available at the present time t, the game is now the “Time Horizon MG” (THMG; the 
case of a limitlessly growing τ corresponds to the standard MG; the THMG refers to the case of a 
fixed and finite τ). This is the key optimization step. If her best strategy predicts A(t)=+1 (resp. -
1), she will take the action ai(t) = - 1 (resp. +1) in order to hope to be in the minority. The aggre-
gate behavior A(t) = Σi=1N  ai(t) is then added to the information set available for the next itera-
tion at time t+1.  
The characte
ding instantaneous payoff of agent i which is given by – ai(t) A(t)—the minus sign encodes 
the minority rule (and similarly for each strategy for which it is added to the τ-1 previous payoffs. 
More simply, the payoff may also be – Sign[ai(t) A(t)]. This does not change the fundamental dy-
namics of the game nor has it any effect on the question we are here studying). As the name of 
the game indicates, if a strategy is in the minority (ai(t)A(t) < 0), it is rewarded. In other words, 
agents in the MG and THMG try to be anti-imitative.  
The richness and complexity of minority games 
rent. Previous investigations have shown the existence of a phase transition marked by agent 
cooperation and efficiency between an inefficient regime (worse than random) and a random-like 
regime as the control parameter 2
mα ≡  is increased: In the vicinity of the phase transition at N
2 0.34c
m
rmalized variance σ2/N) falls below the random coin-toss limit for large m’s 
(assuming fixed N) when agents always use their highest scoring strategy [5]. In other words, for 
a range of m (given N, S), agent performance is better than what strategy performance would be 
in a game with no agents optimizing. The phenomenon discussed in [2] is that when optimizing, 
and averaged over all actual agents and their component strategies in a given realization, and then 
averaged over many such initial quenched disorder states, agents in the TH variant of the MG 
nonetheless underperform the mean of their own measured strategy performance and do so in all 
c Nα = ≈  (for both the THMG and MG proper), the size of the fluctuations of A(t) (as 
measured by its no
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phases for reasonable lengths of τ at all m. (In the MG, the same statement holds true for “rea-
sonable” run lengths post initializa ion but pre-equilibrium. It holds true post-equilibrium as well 
except for m at or very near c
t
α , but in this region the number of steps to equilibrium is extremely 
large).  
More specifically, for a g n realization, a minority of agents outperform their strategies 
and 
score attains a
d a TH  
only
ny ive
the majority of other agents. (Some may also achieve net positive gain, if rarely.) In the MG 
proper, however, τ is unbounded and a stationary state is reached at some very large 
2 200meqτ ≥ × where a subset of agents “freeze” their choice of strategy: One virtual strategy 
 permanently higher value than any other. These frozen agents in general do outper-
form the mean of all strategies in a given realization as well as the mean of their own S original 
strategies: They perform precisely as well as their best. We focus primarily on results in the 
THMG with an eye towards real-world markets in which because the time series being predicted 
are non-stationary, trading strategies are weakened if they incorporate an unbounded (and uni-
formly-weighted) history of prior strategic success or failure: Remote history is less important 
than recent history and beyond a certain point is meaningless. Unless specifically stated other-
wise, throughout this paper, whenever we compare agent to strategy performance, we always 
mean the performance of agents’ strategies as measured by the accumulation of hypothetical 
points averaged over all agents in the system and the set of all of their strategies. Furthermore, in 
selecting a strategy, the agents do not take account of the impact of their choice on the probable 
minority state—that is, they do not consider that their own selection of action reduces the prob-
ability that this action will be the minority one. (We refer to such agents as “standard”.) 
2.2 Definition and overview of the Majority Game (MAJG) 
Mathematically, the MAJG game differs from the MG (an MAJG from the THMG)
 by a change in sign for the individual agent payoff function: i.e., ( ) ( ) ( )mini ig t a t A t= −  or 
( ) ( ) ( )ming t Sgn a t A t= − ⎡ ⎤  whereas i i⎣ ⎦ ( ) ( ) ( )m ajg t a t A t= +  or i i ( ) ( ) ( )i iSgn a t A t= + ⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦majg t
n, agents are  selec  the 
majority of agents at a time step. Thus, agents strive to be imitative rather than anti-imitative. 
From the perspective of markets, agents in the MG are “pessimistic” in assuming that resources 
are limited so that there can be only a minority of winners; they are “contrarian” in attempting to 
do what they believe most others are not doing. Agents in the MAJG are “optimistic” in assuming 
that resources are boundless, price (and value) potentially rising simply by virtue of collective 
agreement, so that the majority wins; they are “conformist” in attempting to do what they believe 
most others are also doing. Agents in both types of games “believe” that their actions may be op-
timized by examining the past paper-performance of their strategies. 
. In 
consequence of the plus sig  rewarded when they t the alternative selected by
As only a mi ean agent gain ( ) ( )min min
1
1 0
N
i
i
G t g t
N =
= <∑nority of agents win in the MG, m . 
Cumulative wealth tend e. In the MAJG, a majority of agents win so that s to decrease over tim
mean agent gain ( ) ( )m1 0Nmaj ajG t g t= >∑ . Cumulative wealth tends to increase over time. 
1
i
iN =
In the MG, the time series A(t) (the sum of all agents’ actions) is typically anti-persistent, 
paralleling the anti-imitative behavior of individual agents. In the MAJG the time series A(t) is 
typically persistent, paralleling the imitative behavior of individual agents. 
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2.3 Definition and overview of the Dollar Game ($G) 
The dollar game was introduced in [8] in order to capture more accurately the behavior of 
trad
recisely one that rationally alternates 
betw
ers in markets, while keeping a framework as close as possible to the initial MG set-up. 
Above we commented that agents in the MG are “contrarian” in attempting to do what most oth-
ers are not. But this is not what true contrarian traders attempt: First, they attempt to be in the ma-
jority when the market is rising. They likewise attempt to be in the minority when it is falling or 
when there is a turning point. And this is exactly what non-contrarian traders are also attempting. 
Indeed every trader attempts to do this. Contrarians differ from conformists in their reasoning as 
to what the market trend will be in the immediate future. They make predictions that typically 
differ from the majorities’ prediction—but they may or may not be correct. Like all others, they 
will still hope that, if correct, it will lead them to be in the majority in one instance and the minor-
ity in the other, as is appropriate according to the corresponding market phase. A similar correc-
tion to the description of “conformist” traders can be made. 
Thus, an agent with greater “real world” behaviors is p
een choosing what he believes will be the minority state and choosing what he believes will 
be the majority state. Ideally, he wants to start choosing to try to be in the majority state at the 
first moment the market begins a rise following a decline—i.e., at a convex inflection point. Like-
wise, he ideally wants to start choosing to try to be in the minority state at the first moment the 
market begins a decline following a rise—i.e., at a concave inflection point. This behavior may be 
most simply captured by the following alteration in the rule for individual agent gain: 
( ) ( ) ( )$ 1i ig t a t A t= + −  or ( ) ( ) ( )$ 1i ig t Sgn a t A t= + −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ . That is, it is the action at the previous 
d a  A(t) will be >0 or <0, that determines 
whether an agent gains or loses. The mean agent gain retains the same form: 
time step t-1, interprete s a judgment about whether
( ) ( )$ $1 N iG t g t= ∑ and we anticipate that 
1iN =
( )$ 0G t > because in spite of the time-lagged ( )1ia t − , 
is preceded by a + sign, vely should generate largely imitativ -
ior. This intuition is confirmed by the numerical simulations presented in Ref.[8]. 
 
the payoff function  so intuiti e behav
. Main results on the “illusion of control” in the THMG v. MAJG and $G 
rspective of 
ut
3
Our main result with respect to the THMG may be stated concisely from the pe
ility theory and has been detailed extensively in [2]: Throughout the space of parameters (N, m, 
S, eqτ τ ), the mean payoff of agents’ strategies (as calculated by each agent averaged over all 
strategies and agents in a realization) not only surpasses the mean payoff of supposedly-
optimizing agents (averaged over all given agents), but the respective cumulative distribution 
functions (CDF) of payoffs show a first-order stochastic dominance of strategies over agents. 
Thus, were the option available to them, agents would behave in a risk-averse fashion (concave 
utility function) by switching randomly between strategies rather than optimizing. Agents are 
supposed to enhance their performance by choosing adaptively between their available strategies. 
In fact, the opposite is true. (In the MG proper the situation is more complex and is discussed at 
length in [2]. Here we note only that two conditions must hold for the statement to be false: (1) m 
≥ mc; (2) the system must be allowed to reach equilibrium. Condition (2) requires an exceedingly 
large number of preliminary steps before agent selection begins, and orders of magnitude more 
steps if m º  mc ). 
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Let us restate our result for the THMG in the language of a financial market with traders try-
ing to outperform the overall market. We argue that, in using the THMG as a model for traders’ 
actions, the following is the case: Every trader attempting to optimize by selecting his “best per-
forming strategy” measures that performance virtually, not by contrast to an imagined setting 
where all traders select fixed strategies at random (to whose results he would have no access 
anyway). Even though the virtual performances of each of his basket of strategies might never 
have been implemented in reality, if he found that his real performance under a selection process 
was worse than the virtual performance of the strategies he had been selecting among, he would 
abandon the selection process. This would be true for most agents and not true only for a small 
minority. (If every trader were to do the same, of course, then one would end up with a random or 
fixed choice game in which agents’ mean performance approaches 
2
0.5N
σ = , where σ  is the 
standard deviation of the variation in A(t). (This forms the usual standard of comparison for strat-
egy performance in the MG literature.) This resonates with the findin n and Wr ht [9], 
who report that two-thirds of all finance professors at accredited, four-year universities and col-
leges in the U.S. (arguably among the most sophisticated and informed financial investors) are 
passive investors who think that the traditional valuation techniques are all unimportant in the 
decision of whether to buy or sell a specific stock (in particular, the CAPM, APT and Fama and 
French and Carhart models). 
However, in both the MAJG and the $G, we find that the reverse is true: The optimization 
method greatly enhances agen
g of Dora ig
t performance, with strategies’ virtual mean performance consisting 
of relatively small gains and agents’ mean performance consisting of significantly greater gains. 
In the language used above: “Throughout the space of parameters (N, m, S, eqτ τ ), the mean 
payoff of agents’ strategies (as calculated by each agent averaged over all strategies and agents in 
a realization) not only underperforms the mean payoff of optimizing agents ed over all 
given agents), but the respective cumulative distribution functions (CDF) of payoffs show a first-
order stochastic dominance of agents over strategies. Thus, were the option available to agents to 
behave in a risk-averse fashion (concave utility function) by switching randomly between strate-
gies rather than optimizing, they would rationally avoid such risk in favor of the optimization 
procedure. Agents are supposed to enhance their performance by choosing adaptively between 
their available strategies and they in fact do so.” 
 
4. Quantitative statement and tests 
(averag
.1 Analytic Calculation versus Numeric Simulation 
ct is observed for all N, m, S and eq
4
τ τ  . We use the 
t to both a THMAJG and a TH$G to ob-
ΔWStrat
In the THMG, the “illusion of control” effe
Markov chain formalism for the THMG [7] and extend i
tain theoretical prediction for the gains, ΔWAgent averaged over all agents and egy averaged 
over all strategies respectively, of agents and of all strategies in a given realization [10] for each 
of the MG, MAJG and $G:  
 1gameagent DNW A μΔ = ± ⋅
K K
 (1) 
 ( )12 ˆgamestrategy NW μ κ μ= ⋅ ⋅s K KΔ  (2) 
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In Eq.s (1) and (2), brackets denote a time average. The superscript “game” identifies th e 
type with
e gam
 { }, ,$game M MAJ∈ . In Eq. (1), the minus sign is needed for the MG; otherwise not. 
μ is a ( )m τ+ -bit ” [10] (sequence of 1-bit states); “path history μK  is the normalized steady-state 
tor for the history-dependent probability vec ( ) ( )m mτ τ+ × +  tra ition matrix Tˆ , where a given 
element 
1,t t
T
ns
μ μ − represents the transition probability that 1tμ −  will be followed by tμ ; DA
K
 is a 
( )2 m τ+ -elem  of decided values of A(t) associated with
path-histo
ent vector listing the particular sum
ry; ˆ
 each 
μs  is the table of points accumulated by each strategy for each path-his ryto ; κK  is a 
2( )m τ+ -element vector listing the total number of times each strategy is represented in the collec-
tion of N agents.  As shown Ref. [2], Tˆ  may be derived from DA
K
, ˆμs  and UN
K
, the number of un-
ed agents associated with each path history.  Thus agents’ mean gain is determined by the 
non-stochastic contribution to A(t) we
is because the stochastic contribution for each path history is binomially distributed about the de-
termined contribution. Strategies’ mean gain is determined by the change in points associated 
with each strategy over each path-history weighted by the probability of that path.   
Agreement is excellent between numerical simulations and the analytical predictions (2.1) 
and (2.2) for the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G. For instance, for m=2, S=2, τ=1 a
decid
ighted by the probability of the possible path histories. This 
nd N=31, for 
one identical quenched disorder state, Table 1 shows the payoff per time step averaged over time 
and over all agents and all strategies for both analytic and numerical methods. In this numerical 
example, the average payoff of individual agents is smaller than for strategies by −0.15 units per 
time step in the THMG, but larger by +0.35 units in the THMAJG and by +0.33 units in the 
TH$G. Thus, in this example, optimization appears to agents as genuine in the THMAJG and 
TH$G but would seem illusory in the THMG. 
Table 1: Numeric and Analytic Results for a single typical quenched initial disorder state in 
the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G 
Numeric game
agentWΔ  gamestrategyWΔ Analytic gameWΔ gamestrategyWΔ  agent
MG −0.21 −0.06 −0.21 −0.06 MG
MAJG +0.43 +0.08 MAJG +0.43 +0.08 
$G +0.39 +0.06 $G +0.40 +0.06 
The above re  ill prim he close alignment of analytic and numerical methods 
in generating results. Of greater interest is the comparison of agent versus strategy gains among 
the M
sults ustrate arily t
G, MAJG and $G at various values of m below, at and above mc, and at various values of τ 
both for eqτ τ , for eqτ τ<  and for eqτ τ≥ —all  averaged over a large ensemble of randomly 
selected quenched disorder states. The computational  resources required to evaluate the analytic 
expression s fors  grow  gameagent  as WΔ 2m τ+∝ . We therefore report only the numerical results. 
4.2 Illusory versus Gen eqτ  uine Control forτ
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are illustrated for 1τ =Almost all results that hold for multiple values of eqτ τ . In Figure 
1, F hic rep
age 
igure 2 and Figure 3 we therefore first present grap resentations of the ensemble aver-
of 50 runs comparable to Table 1 but over many values of m.  
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Figure 1: Agent versus Strategy mean per-step gain in the THMG at various m with τ=1. The phase transition ex-
pected at m=4 is absent; strategies outperform agents at all m as indicated by the black square: ent performance is Ag
always negative relative to strategy performance. The optimization procedure employed by agents yields worse per-
formance than their component strategies on the basis of which agents select which strategies to deploy at each time-
step. 
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Figure 2: Agent versus Strategy mean per-step gain in the THMAJG at various m with τ=1. Agent performance is 
always positive and greater than strategy performance. The optimization procedure employed b ents yields better y ag
performance than their component strategies. 
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Figure 3: Agent versus Strategy mean per-step gain in the TH$G at various m with τ=1. Agent performance is al-
ways greater than strategy performance. The optimization procedure employed by agents yields better performance 
than their component strategies, but the gain becomes asymptotically small for large m’s. 
We see that the illusion of control in the THMG persists at all values of m. Incidentally we 
note that the phase transition to be expected at m=4 is strongly surpressed in the sense that the 
present metric is not sensitive to it. For both the THMAJG and the TH$G, the control exerted by 
agents is non-illusory: Agents outperform their constituent strategies at all m. Because of the non 
time-lagged implementation of a majority rule in the THMAJG, strategies show consistent posi-
tive gain, even if less than agents. Strategies’ gain tends toward a positive limit with agents’ gain 
tending toward a greater value at all m. However, in the TH$G, strategies on their own, in the ag-
gregate, tend toward zero gain with increasing m, as would be expected from a realistic model of 
a market. Agents are superior to strategies at all m, but converge to the zero limit of strategy gain 
with increasing m. In other words, of the three variations, the TH$G with very short τ shows the 
most satisfying convergence toward neither net positive nor net negative gain for both strategies 
and agents as strategy complexity increases and begins to approximate random selection. It is es-
pecially interesting that this is so, given that the $G rule remains a majority one, albeit time-
lagged by one step to take into account the time lag between decision and return realization [8]. 
4.3 Illusory versus Genuine Control for eqτ τ<  
In Figure 4, Figure 5 and Figure 6 we present graphic representations of the ensemble aver-
age of 50 runs of the MG, MAJG and $G comparable to Table 1 but over many values of m and 
with eqτ τ< , i.e. with a time window of “reasonable” size, but smaller than the equilibrium value 
(except for m=2, where 800eq = ). τ
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Figure 4: Agent versus Strategy mean gain per-step in the THMG at various m with τ=1000. The phase transition 
expected at m=4 is clearly visible; strategies outperform agents at all m as indicated by the black square: Agent per-
formance is always negative relative to strategy performance. Even with a very long lookback of historical data, the 
optimization procedure employed by agents yields worse performance than their component strategies on the basis of 
which agents select which strategies to deploy at each time-step. 
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Figure 5: Agent versus Strategy mean gain per-step in the THMAJG at various m with τ=1000. Agent performance 
is always positive and greater than strategy performance. The optimization procedure employed by agents yields bet-
ter performance than their component strategies. 
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Figure 6: Agent versus Strategy mean gain per-step in the TH$G at various m with τ=1000. Agent performance is 
always greater than strategy performance. The optimization procedure employed by agents yields better performance 
than their component strategies. 
We see that once again, the illusion of control in the THMG persists at all values of m in 
spite of the “reasonable” length (1000 time steps) of τ. Note, however, that the phase transition at 
m=4 is now visible—even though at m=4 the system is still far from equilibrium. (Recall that 
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away from mc, we have ; while for m near mc, we have .) In the MG 
proper, where τ grows without bound and agent and strategy performance begins to be measured 
only after 
100 2meqτ ≈ × 100 2meqτ ×
eqτ  steps, agent performance will exceed strategy performance—optimization suc-
ceeds—but only for . But even for a relatively small number of agents (e.g., 31, as here), 
at m=10 say,  steps is unrealistically large (for a comparison with stan-
dard technical investment strategies used for financial investments). For both the THMAJG and 
the TH$G, the control exerted by agents is again non-illusory: Agents outperform their constitu-
ent strategies at all m. Strategies in the THMAJG again show consistent positive gain, if less than 
agents. Strategies’ gain likewise tends toward a positive limit with agents’ gain tending toward a 
greater value at all m, just as for 
cm≥
112 200,000>
1
m
100≈ ×eqτ
τ = . Likewise in the TH$G once more: Strategies on their own, 
in the aggregate, tend toward zero gain with increasing m, as would be expected from a realistic 
model of a market. Agents are superior to strategies at all m, but converge to the zero limit of 
strategy gain with increasing m. We may draw a similar conclusion for 1000τ =  as for 1τ = : 
The TH$G with reasonable τ shows the most satisfying convergence toward neither net positive 
nor net negative gain for both strategies and agents as strategy complexity increases and begins to 
approximate random selection, in line with what would be expected from the efficient market hy-
pothesis [12,13]. 
 
5. Interpretations: crowding-out, anti-optimizing agents and persistence 
5.1 Illusion of control and the crowding-out mechanism 
Illusion-of-control effects in the THMG result from the fact that a strategy that has per-
formed well in the past becomes crowded out in the future due to the minority mechanism [2]: 
Performing well in the recent past, there is a larger probability for a strategy to be chosen by an 
increasing number of agents, which inevitably leads to its failing. Optimizing agents tend on av-
erage to adapt to the past but not the present. They choose an action a(t) which is on average out-
of-phase with the collective action A(t). In contrast, non-optimizing (random- or fixed-choice) 
agents average over all the regimes for which their strategy may be good and bad, and do not face 
the crowding-out effect. The crowding-out effect also explains simply why anti-optimizing agents 
over-perform [2]: Choosing their worst strategy ensures that it will be the least used by other 
agents in the next time step, which makes it more probable that they will be in the minority. In 
Ref.[2], we consider generalizations of the MG in which more clever agents use this insight to 
develop strategies based on their awareness of prior-level effects: when agents use a boundless 
recursion scheme to learn and optimize their strategy, the game converges to an equilibrium with 
fully symmetric mixed strategies where agents randomize their choice at each time step with un-
biased coin tosses! The crowding mechanism also predicts that the smaller the parameter 2m/N, 
the larger the illusion-of-control effect. Indeed, as one considers larger and larger values of 2m/N, 
it becomes more and more probable that agents have their strategies in different reduced strategy 
classes, so that a strategy which is best for an agent tells nothing about the strategies used by the 
other agents, and the crowding out mechanism does not operate. Thus, regions of successful op-
timization, if they occur at all, are more likely at higher values of  2m/N (See Appendix A for fur-
ther details.) 
By contrast, in all of the MAJG, $G, THMAJG and TH$G, with their variants of a majority 
mechanism for agent gain, a strategy that has performed well in the past is likely to do so again in 
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the future. The domain of successful optimization encompasses all m, but diminishing as m in-
creases and strategies become widely dispersed in strategy space, approximating ever more 
closely a collection of random decision makers. The optimization procedure is most effective in 
the $G where the positive bias present even for strategies alone in the MAJG appears neutralized 
by the time-delayed factor: On their own, strategies show effectively neither gain nor loss. Gains 
are therefore due solely to the optimization procedure. Given this, we predict that anti-optimizing 
agents should show no advantage over their optimizing counterparts in the MAJG and $G and 
will rather underperform. The next section presents results of simulations testing this prediction. 
5.2. Illusion of control and “anti-optimizing” agents 
We select 3 of 31 agents to function “counteradaptively” (“c agents”) and the remaining to 
function in the standard fashion (“s agents”). c-agents “anti-optimize”—at each time-step they 
deploy that strategy with the fewest virtual points accumulated over τ, rather than the strategy 
with the most points as do s-agents. In [2], we studied this phenomenon in the “crowded regime” 
( ,cm m cα α< <
100
) where crowd and anti-crowd formation is likely and the minority mechanism 
causes the larger-sized crowds to lose. In this regime, c-agents that choose their worst performing 
strategy consistently outperform s-agents that choose their best. Here we display results obtained 
for a wide range of m both less than, and greater than , for the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G 
with 
cm
τ = . τ is long enough so that the phase transition in the MG is not suppressed at (=4 
for n=31). 
cm
Figure 7 shows c-agent minus s-agent mean per-step change in wealth for 2<m<14, each av-
eraged over 100 runs of 100 days post-τ=400. In the THMG, in the crowded regime, the illusion 
of control effect is so strong that c-agents significantly outperform s-agents. Because we know 
that, for all m at this τ, agents underperform strategies, we see that the opposite is true for c-
agents: In the act of “anti-optimizing”, they actually optimize. However, as the phase transition 
approaches, this becomes less true. Indeed at and after —that is, in the non-crowded re-
gime—s-agents outperform c-agents, converging to zero difference with increasing m. We know 
however that these s-agents for large m are nonetheless underperforming their strategies. Thus, 
while the illusion of control effect remains present, it is not strong enough for c-agents to outper-
form s-agents in this regime. 
cm cm
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Figure 7: Difference between c-agent and s-agent mean per-step change in wealth for 3 of 31 c-agents, averaged 
over 100 days and 200 runs with τ=400 in the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G.  
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By contrast with the results for the THMG, c-agents in the THMAJG and TH$G consistently 
underperform s-agents as predicted from the success of the optimization scheme at all m (again 
converging to zero difference at large m). The size of this underperformance for anti-optimizing 
agents is consistent with the large degree of standard optimization success as shown in Figure 5 
and Figure 6. 
5.3 Persistence versus Anti-persistence in the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G 
As discussed in [2], in the MG and THMG, the degree to which agents underperform their 
own strategies varies with the phase as parameterized by a. As noted in [7], in the crowded phase 
( ,c m mcα α< < ), the “crowd” of such agents choosing an action at any given time-step acts like a 
single “super-agent”; the remaining agents as a (non-synchronized) “anti-crowd” whose actions 
will conform to the minority choice. Thus, when a strategy is used, it is probably used by more 
than one agent, often by many agents. By enough, it becomes a losing strategy with large prob-
ability—precisely because so many agents “think” it’s the best choice and use it. This implies that 
at the next time step, agents will not use it. The time-series of determined choices DA
K
therefore 
does not show trends (or persistence), but rather anti-persistence.  
Anti-persistence is not equivalent to “random” and is scale-dependent. Consider a binary time-
series with an m-bit  defined in the same way as we have in the MG or THMG: ( )tμ ( )tμ  is a 
sliding window of 1-bit states each of length m:  ( ) ( ) (, 1 ,s t m s t m s t− − + … ) . A perfectly anti-
persistent binary series at scale m=2, for example, is characterized as follows: Select any one in-
stance of the four possible ( ) { }00,01,10,11tμ ∈ . Identify the following bit ( ) { }1+ ∈ 0,1s t . Now 
identify the next instance of the selected ( )tμ . If the series is perfectly anti-persistent, the follow-
ing bit will always be 1 if the previous following bit was 0, and 0 if the previous following bit 
was 1.  A perfectly anti-persistent series can be generated by two lookup tables indicating what 
bit follows which . Whatever bit is indicated by the first table, the opposite bit is indicated 
by the second. Whenever an entry in a table is used for a given 
( )tμ
( )tμ , the other table is used when 
 occurs again [14]. These tables are identical to strategy pairs at the maximum Hamming 
distance in the MG. No matter which of the 2m+1=16 possible strategies is used for the first table, 
and regardless of which of the 2m=4 possible 
( )tμ
( )tμ  are used to initiate it, the time series generated 
by these tables will rapidly settle into perfect anti-persistence. 
The “persistence” P of a given series at scale sm  is thus simply the proportion of persistent 
such following bits, counting every instance of each of the 2  possible histories. Its “anti-
persistence” is 1 minus the persistence. Other waya of stating the same thing is that given 
m
sm , the 
persistence of a series is the proportion of times that histories of length end in bits 00 or 
11; anti-persistence is the proportion they end in 01 or 10 
1m +s
The process generating a given empirical series may ne unknown. This unknown process may 
itself be a memory-related process such as in the games we are discussing; it need not be (it could 
be, for example, completely random). The process may likewise be Markovian and memory-
related as are the time-series generated by the TH games; it may be memory-related but non-
Markovian as the non-TH version of these games. If the process is memory-related, whether 
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Markovian or not, we need to distinguish between the unknown length m (or m τ+ ) underlying 
the process and a length we denote as ms indicating the scale of our analysis. Intuitively, it would 
seem that choosing  or sm m= sm m τ= + , would yield the most robust analysis of persistence 
versus anti-persistence. But if the memory length of the process is unknown, this cannot be done.  
In the case of a TH game, all paths of length m τ+ transition to other paths of equal length with 
known probabilities as these games are Markovian. The scale m τ+  would seem even more natu-
ral since all quantities can be determined exactly using analytic methods, at least in principle. See 
[15,16] for an illuminating study on how to determine the optimal coarse-grained scale in simple 
cellular automata.  
However, for m or τ large, the transition matrices become intractably large as well, scaling as 
2(m )τ+
m
. We thus need to know whether the degree of persistence/antipersistence may be ap-
proximated at a lower effective ms: I.e., given a binary time-series generated by an unknown 
process, may we usefully characterize its persistence by a small value of ms to replace its ‘actual’ 
m or τ+ ? Before analyzing the degree of persistence and anti-persistence in the MG, MAJG 
and $G, we first show that, in fact, relatively small values of ms do successfully characterize per-
sistence. 
We implement an algorithm to characterize the persistence of a binary time series as described 
above. We find sharp differences in the degree of persistence between the time series generated 
by the MG on the one hand and the time series generated by the MAJG and $G on the other. A 
less sharp distinction also emerges between the MAJG and the $G. We find as well that charac-
teristic distinctions arise at all reasonable m, attenuating as m grows large and at all reasonable 
scales. This last point is important: While the degree of persistence is obviously best captured for 
the TH variants of these games as the natural scale m τ+  (since the TH games are Markovian), it 
is not obvious that a small-m scale will effectively capture distinctions in the MG, MAJG and $G 
proper as the natural scale is large and unbounded. It emerges that in general, if a significant de-
gree of persistence or antipersistence is characteristic at a large-m scale, it may be approximated 
by a low-m analysis. We demonstrate this, and the differential characteristics of the respective 
time series in the following. 
Figure 8 illustrates graphically the mean degree of persistence or anti-persistence averaged 
over 25 different initializations identically shared by each of the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G 
with N=31, S=2, τ=100 and { }2,3,...,10m ∈ , scale { }2,3,...10∈ . The generally darker shade in all 
squares of the grid representing the THMG implies values closer to or consistent with anti-
persistence (<0.5, with 0.5 representing the equal degree of persistence and anti-persistence of a 
random sequence), those in the THMAJG and TH$G with persistence (>0.5).  
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Figure 8: Persistence (white)/Anti-Persistence (black) at various scales and memory lengths in the MG, MAJG and 
$G. The grey scale between 0 and 1 given to the right of the checkboards encodes the degree of persistence at the 
chosen scale (abscissa) for different m values (ordinate), calculated as described in the text, using game-generated 
binary histories of length 1000 over 100 different runs for each game type  
The fraction of persistent sequences up cells of increasing m are roughly similar on a relative 
basis up the columns of different scales, but shifted toward the random, especially for the 
THMAJG and TH$G. The fraction of persistent sequences up cells of increasing m in the THMG 
shows a shifting transition point. This feature is seen most sharply along the upward-and-to-the-
right diagonal which represents the relation scale=m.  Figure 9 charts the degree of persistence 
along this diagonal for all three games. 
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Figure 9: Persistence/Anti-Persistence at various scales = memory lengths in the MG, MAJG and $G 
At the phase transition ( for N=31), the time-series generated by the THMG when the 
scale equals m undergoes a transition from anti-persistence to persistence and then declines as-
ymptotically to the random limit 0.5. When 
4cm =
≠  this transition occurs at either smaller or lar-
ger values of m. Both the THMAJG and TH$G generate persistent time-series exclusively. The 
degree of persistence declines monotonically to the random limit 0.5 with increasing m. Persis-
tence in the THMAJG is always greater than in the TH$G. 
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6 Conclusions 
The “illusion of control” is an unfortunate confounding effect that appears in many situations 
of “bounded rationality” where optimization occurs with limited (inadequate) information. How-
ever ubiquitous the illusion may be, it is not universal. In ref. [2], we note that the illusion of con-
trol effect in the THMG is fundamentally due to three ingredients: (i) the minority mechanism (an 
agent or a strategy gains when in the minority and loses otherwise); (ii) the selection of strategies 
by many agents because they were previously in the minority, hence less likely to be so in the 
present; and (iii) the crowding of strategies (i.e., few strategies for many agents). We see in the 
preceding analysis of persistence, that there is a close relationship among these three characteris-
tics, a high degree of anti-persistence in the resulting time-series and the illusion of control. On 
the other hand, genuine control is more likely to be present when the underlying mechanism em-
ployed by agents is not of the minority type (as in the MAJG and $G) and the resulting time-
series is therefore more likely to be persistent. In another paper [3], we extend this analysis to the 
types of Hamiltonian cycles on graphs found associated with persistent and anti-persistent series, 
and employ these methods for generating predictors of empirically generated time-series, both in 
models and in the real world. 
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Appendix: Analytic Methods for the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G for 
choosing the best strategy 
To emphasize the relation of the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G to market-games and to either 
genuine or illusory optimization, we have transformed the fundamental results of the games from 
statements on the properties of  2 Nσ  to change in wealth, i.e., W tΔ Δ  for agents and  W tΔ Δ  for 
strategies. We use the simplest possible formulation—if an agent’s actual (or strategy’s hypo-
thetical) vote places it in the winning group (minority in the THMG, majority in the THMAJG 
and TH$G), it scores +  points, otherwise 1 1− . Formally: At every discrete time-step t, each agent 
independently re-selects one of its S strategies. It “votes” as the selected strategy dictates by tak-
ing one of two “actions,” designated by a binary value: 
( ) { }1,0 ,   ,ia t i t∈ ∀  (A.1)   
In the simplest version of the MG, MAJG and $G with N agents, every agent has S = 2 strategies 
and m = 2. In the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G, the point (or score) table associated with strate-
gies is not maintained from the beginning of the game and is not ever growing. It is a rolling win-
dow of finite length τ (in the simplest case 1τ = ). The standard MG reaches an equilibrium state 
after a finite number of steps stt . At this point, the dynamics and the behavior of individual agents 
for a given initial quenched disorder in the MG are indistinguishable from an otherwise identical 
THMG with sttτ ≥ . The present formulation follows closely that presented in Appendix A.1 of 
[2], applying it simultaneously to all three games, the THMG, THMAJG and TH$G. 
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The state of the system as a whole at time t is a mapping of the sum of all the agents’ actions 
to the integer set { }12N N− , where  is the number of 1 votes and 1N 0N N N1= − . This mapping 
is defined as : 
 ( ) ( ) 1 0
1
2
N
i
i
A t a t N N N
=
= − = −∑  (A.2) 
If ( ) 2NA t > , then the minority of agents will have chosen 0 at time t ( ); if 0N N< 1 ( ) 2NA t < , 
then the minority of agents will have chosen 1 at time t ( 1N N0< ). In the MG the minority choice 
is the “winning” decision for t . In both the MAJG and $G the majority choice is the “winning” 
decision for t . This choice is mapped back to { }0,1 : 
( ) ( ) ( ) { } { }Sgn   1, 1 0,1sys sysD t A t D t= − ∴ ∈ − + →⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦  (A.3)  
For the non-TH version all three games, binary strings of length m form histories ( )tμ , with 
. For the TH games, binary strings of length m( )dimm μ= ⎡⎣ t ⎤⎦ τ+  form paths (or “path histo-
ries”), with ( )dim tm τ μ+ = , where we define ( )tμ  as a history in the standard MG and tμ as a 
path in the THMG. Note that for memory m, there are possible strategies from which agents 
select S at random. However as first detailed in ref. [11], the space of strategies can be minimally 
spanned by a subset of all possible strategies. This reduced strategy space [RSS] has dimension 
. As in Ref. [10], we may represent this quenched disorder in the allocation of strategies 
among agents (from the RSS) by a dim = 
22
m
12m+
1m
1
2
S
s
+
=
∏  tensor,  (or from the full strategy space by a 
dim =  tensor). The (or ) strategies are arranged in numerical order along the edges 
of . Each entry represents the number of agents with the set of strategies indicated by the ele-
ment’s position. Then as demonstrated in [10], any THMG has a Markov chain formulation. For 
Ωˆ
2
1
2
m
S
s=
∏
Ωˆ
{
12m+ 22
m
} { }, , 2,2,m S N = 31  and using the RSS, the typical initial quenched disorder in the strategies at-
tributed to each of the N agents is represented by an 8 ×8 matrix Ωˆ  and its symmetrized equiva-
lent ( )ˆ ˆ= Ω + ΩΤ12Ψˆ . Positions along all S edges of  Ωˆ  represent an ordered listing of all avail-
able strategies.  The numerical values ijΩ … in  Ωˆ  indicate the number of times a specific strategy-
tuple has been selected. (E.g., for two strategies per agent, S=2, 2,5Ω =3 means that there are 3 
agents with strategy 2 and strategy 5.) Without loss of generality, we may express   in upper-
triangular form since the order of strategies in a agent has no meaning. The example (A.4) is a 
typical such tensor   for S = 2, N = 31.  
Ωˆ
Ωˆ
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  (A.4) 
1 2 0 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 0 3 3 1 1
0 0 2 0 1 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1ˆ
0 0 0 0 1 0 2 1
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 2 1
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜Ω = ⎜⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
⎟⎟
Actions are drawn from a reduced strategy space (RSS) of dimension . Each action is 
associated with a strategy k and a history 
12mr +=
( )tμ . There are  histories. Together, the score for all 
actions by history and strategy can be represented in table form as a  binary ma-
trix i.e., score(
2m
( )RSS ×dim 2m
{ }) 1,tkaμ ∈ − +1 . In this case, the table reads: 
 
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
aˆ
− − − −
− − + +
− + − +
− + + −
+ − − +
+ − + −
+ + − −
+ + + +
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟≡ ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
 (A.5) 
 
The change in wealth (point gain or loss) associated with each of the r = 8 strategies for the 8 
allowed transitions among the 4 histories) at any time t for each of the three games is then: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }minK T, 1 ˆ 2 1 ,2t t tS a Mod tμ μ μδ − = + × − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦ 1μ  (A.6) 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ){ }, 1 ˆ 2 1 ,2majt t tS a Mod tμ μ μδ μ− = − × − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦T 1
( )
K
 (A.7)  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) { }$ ˆ 2 1 ,2 1S a Mod tδ μ − −⎡ ⎤⎣ ⎦K T
[
, 1− = − 1tμ − ×t tμ μ  (A.8)  
],Mod x y ( )tμ ( )1tμ − label each of the 4 histories { }is “x modulo y”; and 00,01,10,11  hence 
take on one of values { }1,2,3,4 . Equations (A.6), (A.7) and (A.8) pick out from (A.5) the correct 
change in wealth over a single step since the strategies are ordered in symmetrical sequence. 
The change in points associated with each strategy for each of the allowed transitions along 
all the τ histories (i.e., along the path tμ , accounting for the last τ  time steps used to score the 
strategies) is: 
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                ( ) ( )
1
,
0
t
game game
t i t i
i
s S
τ
μ μ μδ
−
1− − −
=
= ∑ KK          (A.9) 
(A.9) accounts for the change in points along path tμ by summing them over all transitions on the 
path, with { }, ,$game min maj∈  For example, for m = 2 and t = 1, the strategy scores are kept for 
only a single time-step and 1 0τ − = so the sum vanishes. (A.9) in matrix form therefore reduces 
to the score: 
( ) ( ), 1t t tμ μ μ
game games Sδ −=
KK
 (A.10)  
or, listing the results for all 8 path histories:  
ˆˆg ame gameμ δ=s S
ˆ
 (A.11) 
gameδS  is an 8μ8 matrix that can be read as a lookup table. It denotes the change in points accu-
mulated over t = 1 time steps for each of the 8 strategies over each of the 8 path-histories. 
Instead of computing , we compute ( )gameA t ( )game tA μ . Then for each of the 2 possible 8
t
m τ+ =
( )tAμ , μ  is composed of a subset of wholly determined agent votes and a subset of undeter-
mined agents whose votes must be determined by a coin toss: 
( ) ( ) ( )game gamet U tAgamet DA Aμ μ μ= +  (A.12) 
Some agents are undetermined at time t because their strategies have the same score and the tie 
has to be broken with a coin toss. ( )AgameU tμ  is a random variable characterized by the binomial 
distribution. Its actual value varies with the number of undetermined agents gameUN . This number 
can be explicated (using an extension to the method employed in [10] for the THMG) as : 
 
( )minU tN μ
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,2 1ˆˆ ˆ1     t tt t mtmin mina a s sδ μ δ μμ μ μ− + − + ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− ⊗ ⊗⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭Ω
K KD DT T
=
(A.13) 
 
( )majU tN μ =
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,2 1ˆˆ ˆ1     t tt t mtmaj maja a s sδ μ δ μμ μ μ− + − + ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− ⊗ ⊗⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭Ω
K KD DT T (A.14) 
 
( )$N μ =
( ) [ ]( ) ( ) [ ]( ) ( ) ( )1 1 1Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,4 1 Mod 1,2 1ˆˆ ˆ1     t tt t mt
U t
$ $a a s sδ μ δ μμ μ μ− − −
− + − + ⎡ ⎤− +⎣ ⎦
⎧ ⎫⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤− ⊗ ⊗⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎩ ⎭Ω
K KD DT T (A.15) 
 “ δ⊗ UN
K
t
” is a generalized outer product, with the product being the Kronecker delta.  constitutes 
a vector of such values.  The summed value of all undetermined decisions for a given μ is dis-
tributed binomially. Note that (A.13) and (A.14) are structurally identical while (A.15) differs 
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from these in that the indices on ( )aˆT  and on the entire expression reference path-histories 
1tμ − rather than tμ , reflecting the one-step time-lag in the payoff for the $G. Similarly: 
 
( )
( ){ } ( )t
8
1 Mod 1,2 1
ˆ ˆ1
t t
m
min
D t
min
rr
A
s aμ μ
μ
μ
= ⎡ ⎤
minSgn s
− +⎣ ⎦
=
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− •⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠∑ Ψ
K K D  (A.16) 
 
( )
( ) ( ){ ( )t
8
1 Mod 1,2 1
ˆ ˆ1
t t
m
maj
D t
maj
rr
A
Sgn s aμ μ
μ
μ
= ⎡ ⎤
}majs
− +⎣ ⎦
=
⎛ ⎞⎡ ⎤⎡ ⎤− • −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠∑ Ψ
K K D  (A.17) 
 
( )
( ) ( ){ } ( )
8
1 Mod 1,2 1
ˆ ˆ1
t t
m
$
D t
$ $
rr
A
Sgn s aμ μ
μ
μ
= ⎡ ⎤t-1
s
− +
=
⎛ ⎞⎤⎡ ⎤− • −⎜ ⎟⎣ ⎦⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠∑ Ψ
K K D  (A.18) ⎡ 
⎣ ⎦
 
Details of the derivation as applying to the THMG may also be found in Ref. [17]. We define 
DA
K
 as a vector of the determined contributions to ( )A t for each path tμ . In expressions (A.11) and 
(A.12) tμ numbers paths from 1 to 8 and is therefore here an index. tsμK is the “ tμ th” vector of net 
point gains or losses for each strategy when at t the system has traversed the path tμ ( i.e., it is the  
“ ˆth” element of the matrix ˆμtμ δ=s S in (A.11)).  “ ”is a generalized outer product of two vec-
tors with subtraction as the product. The two vectors in this instance are the same, i.e., 

t
sμ
K . “ D ” is 
Hadamard (element-by-element) multiplication and “ ”the standard inner product. The index r 
refers to strategies in the RSS. Summation over r transforms the base-ten code for 
i
tμ  into 
{ }1, 2,3, 2,3,4,1, 4 . Selection of the proper number is indicated by the subscript expression on the 
entire right-hand side of (A.13). This expression yields an index number, i.e., selection takes 
place 1 + Modulo 4 with respect to the value of ( )1tμ −  for the THMG and with respect to the 
value of  for the THMAJG and TH$G. ( )1tμ − −1
To obtain the transition matrix for the system as a whole, we require the 2 2m mτ τ+ × +
1,t t
 adjacency 
matrix that filters out disallowed transitions. Its elements are μ μ − : Γ
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  (A.19) 
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 1 0 0ˆ
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 1 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜= ⎜⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
Γ ⎟⎟
 
Equations (A.13), (A.14) and (A.15) yield the history-dependent ( ) ( )m mτ τ+ × +  matrix 
with elements Tˆ
1,t t
Tμ μ − , representing the 16 allowed probabilities of transitions between the two 
sets of  8 path-histories tμ and 1tμ −  (the game-type superscripts on DA  and  are understood in 
context): 
UN
 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( ) { }( )( )
1 1, ,
1
0
1 Sgn 2 2Mod ,2 1
2
t t t t
gamegame game
tUtU tU
game game
NN N
game game
D t U t t
xx
T
A x N
μ μ μ μ
μμ μ
δ μ μ μ
− −
−
=
= Γ ×
⎧ ⎫⎪ ⎪⎛ ⎞ ⎡ ⎤× + − +⎨ ⎬⎜ ⎟ ⎣ ⎦⎝ ⎠⎪ ⎪∑ ^ −⎩ ⎭
(A.20) 
 
The C expression 
( ) ( )1
2
gamegame
tUtU
NN
x
μμ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠^  in  (A.20) represents the binomial distribution of unde-
termined outcomes under a fair coin-toss with mean = ( )gameD tA . Given a specific ,  Ωˆμ
( ) ( )  t D t tA Agame gameμ μ μ= ∀
ˆ
( ) ( )1 2 2, mk n τσ σ +≡ + =Ω Ω …
k
 (A.21)  
We now tabulate the number of times each strategy is represented in Ω , regardless of cou-
pling (i.e., of which strategies are associated in forming agent S-tuples), a value which is the 
same across all games (hence we drop the “game” superscript):  
  (A.22) ( ) { }2 2ˆ ˆm mτ τ+ +K T ( )2 ,n nκ σ
1 1
k
k k= =
=∑ ∑Ψ
where σ  is the kth strategy in the RSS,   and are the kth element (vector) in each ten-
sor and 
ˆ ˆ,Ω ΩTk k kΨˆ
( )kn is present across all strategy tuples. Therefore σ  represents the number of times kσ
 ( )1Agent DNW Abs A μΔ = ± ⋅K K  (A.23) 
(with the minus sign for the MG, otherwise not, i.e., the awarding of points is the negative of the 
direction of the vote imbalance for the MG, and in the direction of the imbalance in the MAJG 
and $G.) and 
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 ( )12 ˆStrategy NW μ κ μΔ = ⋅s ⋅K K  (A.24) 
with μK
Ωˆ
 the normalized steady-state probability vector for . Expression (A.23) states that the 
mean per-step change in wealth for agents equals ±1 times the probability-weighted sum of the 
(absolute value of the) determined vote imbalance associated with a given history, with a minus 
sign for the THMG. Expression (A.24)  states that the mean per-step change in wealth for indi-
vidual strategies equals the probability-weighted sum of the representation of each strategy (in a 
given ) times the sum over the per-step wealth change associated with every history.  
Tˆ
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